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COMMENTS 
The Public Policy Doctrine and Tax Logic: The Need for 
Consistency in Denying Deductions Arising from Illegal Activities 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1981 Anthony J. Accardo and fifteen others were the subjects 
of a criminal prosecution in Florida under the Racketeer Influenced 
& Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),1 Mr. Accardo spent nearly a 
quarter of a million dollars in legal fees defending himself.2 In 1982 
he was acquitted.3 From a tax standpoint, this was an unfortunate 
development for Mr. Accardo; if he had been found guilty he could 
have properly taken a business expense deduction for his monumental 
legal fees. 4 
This seemingly odd result stems from the fact that § 162(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter Code) provides a deduction 
for all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on any 
business.s While legal fees are deductible if incurred in the business 
of racketeering,6 no such deduction is available to one who is 
acquitted of being a racketeer. 7 What appears to be an unjust outcome 
1. Accardo v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 96, 96 (1990), aiI'd, 942 F.2d 444 (7th 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1266 (1992). 
2. [d. at 98. 
3. [d. 
4. Accardo V. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 1266 (1992). The government conceded that the other defendants who 
were found guilty of RICO offenses could properly claim deductions for their 
legal expenses because they were found to be in the business of racketeering. 
[d. 
S. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988). 
6. Although this issue was not decided by the court, the Internal Revenue Service 
conceded this point. Accardo, 942 F.2d at 448. This concession is likely based 
on the seminal case of Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966), in which 
the Supreme Court held that legal fees incurred in the unsuccessful defense 
against criminal charges may be deducted under I.R.C. § 162 if related to the 
taxpayer's business. 
7. Accardo, 942 F.2d at 448. The court explains that Mr. Accardo refused to 
divulge the true nature of his business, citing the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination in response to the government's interrogatories. [d. 
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(allowing an expense deduction to convicted criminals while disallow-
ing favorable tax treatment of the same expense for those who are 
acquitted of crimes) occurs because the Code is designed to tax 
incomes, not punish wrongdoing.8 
The idea that tax deductions may properly accrue to those who 
operate illegal enterprises dates back to the adoption of the first 
federal tax code in 1913.9 It soon became clear, however, that this 
result was unpalatable to the courts, which developed what has come 
to be known as the "public policy doctrine. "10 Throughout much of 
this century, the judiciary has used this doctrine to deny deductions 
which would otherwise be allowed under the Code. 
The majority of cases making reference to the public policy 
doctrine have involved the general business expense deduction pro-
vided in I.R.C. § 162.11 Once the public policy doctrine .had been 
fully developed by the courts, therefore, it was logical that Congress 
chose to codify it by amending § 162 to preclude certain deductions 
emanating from illegal activitiesY Section 162, however, is not the 
only deduction provision found in the Internal Revenue Code. Section 
165, for example, provides a deduction for losses sustained by the 
taxpayer.13 While recognizing that the public policy doctrine as ap-
plied to § 162 has been legislatively abrogated regarding that section, 14 
the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter "Service") and the courts 
8. See infra notes 17-23 and accompanying text (explaining the debate concerning 
deductions from illegal income). 
9. Senator Williams, the floor manager of the 1913 Revenue Act, commented 
that "the object of this bill is to tax a man's net income; ... not to reform 
men's moral characters .... " 50 CONGo REc. 3849 (1913). During the floor 
debates, Senator Sterling twice attempted to amend the business deduction 
language so that only expenses incurred in lawful or legitimate enterprises 
would be allowed such a deduction; both attempts were rejected. [d. at 3849-
50. 
10. See infra part Ill. (explaining the development of the "public policy doctrine"). 
11. The language of § 162(a) of the 1986 Code (the current version of the tax 
statutes) was formerly contained in § 23(a) of the 1939 Code. Since the language 
in the two provisions is identical, all references will be to the 1986 Code. In 
both incarnations, the provision allows a deduction for "all the ordinary and 
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any 
trade or business .... " I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988). 
12. The amendments were accomplished by adding several new subsections to § 162 
of the Code. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 
(codified as amended in I.R.C. § 162(c), (f), (g) (1988». 
13. I.R.C. § 165(a) (1988). Although business-type deductions could fall under 
other sections of the Code (e.g., § 212, which allows an individual to deduct 
the cost of producing income or maintaining income-producing property, I.R.C. 
§ 212(1), (2) (1988», this Comment will focus on §§ 162 and 165, as these 
sections are the most likely to be involved in an application of the publiC" 
policy doctrine to deny a deduction. 
14. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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have sought to apply a distinguishable version of the doctrine to 
other business deductions, particularly those claimed under § 165. 
This Comment begins by outlining the rationale behind allowing 
deductions related to illegal activity, demonstrating that the Code 
was intended to be blind to the legal status of a taxpayer's business. 
The evolution of the public policy doctrine is then explored from its 
judicial inception to legislative codification in I.R.C. § 162. From 
this analysis comes the conclusion that the public policy doctrine, as 
limited by various Supreme Court decisions, is coextensive with the 
limitations now found in § 162. If this premise is accepted, claimed 
deductions relating to a business should only be disallowed on the 
basis of public policy when they fall into a category articulated by 
one of the limiting provisions of that section. 
II. DEDUCTIONS FOR RACKETEERS 
Few would argue with the notion that income from illegal 
activities should be subject to taxation; were this not the case, 
nefarious individuals could avoid taxation merely by choosing to 
earn their living outside the bounds of the law. The Code itself averts 
this disaster by declaring that "all income from whatever source 
derived" is to be included as gross incomels and used in the calcu-
lation to arrive at taxable income. The issue at hand, therefore, is 
not whether illegal income should be taxed, but whether a higher 
burden of taxation should be imposed on individuals obtaining 
income through illegal means.· This would be accomplished, for 
example, by denying deductions based on the illegal nature of the 
source of these deductions or of the sources of income to which they 
relate. 16 
As noted, the Code permits a deduction for expenses incurred 
in carrying on "any trade or business."17 Before this language was 
first enacted in 1913,18 it was proposed that "trade or business" be 
15. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1988). Because of this expansive language, the government has 
been able to make use of the tax laws to obtain convictions when it is difficult 
to get evidence of the crimes used to obtain the unreported income. See, e.g., 
Rich Exner, Reputed Smut King Convicted of Tax Evasion, UNITED PRESS 
INT'L, Nov. 17, 1987. 
16. Tax liability is determined by application of a rate to taxable income. Taxable 
income is "net" income because it is arrived at by subtracting deductions from 
gross income; applying the rate to gross income, will therefore, result in a 
higher tax burden. 
17. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988). 
18. Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, § lIB, 38 Stat. 114, 167. Note that although § lIB 
of the 1913 Act provided that any lawful income was to be taxed, the term 
"lawful" was deleted from the statute in 1916. See Tax Act of 1916, ch. 463, 
§ 5(a), 39 Stat. 756, 759. 
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modified by the words "legitimate" or "lawful" so as to disallow 
deductions arising out of a trade or business carried on in violation 
of the law. 19 These proposals were rejected for at least two reasons. 
Using illegal gambling operations as an example,20 Senator McCumber 
pointed out during consideration of the legislation that taxing win-
nings while disallowing a deduction for losses would amount to 
taxing the same income twice.21 Secondly, it was emphasized in the 
floor debates that the tax legislation was meant to be blind to the 
character of both the taxpayer and their means of obtaining income.22 
As a result, language permitting deductions for both legitimate and 
illegitimate enterprises was adopted and has remained unchanged -
through three subsequent overhauls of the Code.23 
There remains, moreover, the unanswered question of whether 
Congress possesses the power to impose a tax on the gross income 
of an illegal business, a result achieved by denying the deduction of 
expenses. This particular taxing power of Congress is established by 
the Sixteenth Amendment, which authorizes a tax on "incomes. "24 
Although the Supreme Court has never directly considered the issue,25 
the accepted view is that the term "incomes" as used in the Sixteenth 
Amendment refers only to net income. 26 
19. See supra note 9. 
20. Senator Sterling's chief concern, apparently, was subjecting the illegal gambling 
industry to a higher tax burden. See 50 CONGo REC. 3849-50 (1913). 
21. Id. at 3850. Double taxation occurs whenever an expenditure results in income 
to one party without a corresponding deduction to the other party. 
22. "The law does not care where he got it from, so far as the tax is concerned." 
Id. at 3849 (remarks of Senator Williams in response to proposals that 
deductions related to illegal businesses should not be allowed). 
23. Although portions of the Code undergo minor changes and technical corrections 
nearly every year, major revisions of the Code were undertaken in 1939, 1954, 
and 1986; these codifications are commonly referred to as the 1939 Code, the 
1954 Code, and the 1986 Code. The "current" Code is the 1986 Code. 
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
25. In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Court stated 
that the term "income" as used in I.R.C. § 61(a) (referring to "gross income") 
was being used in its "constitutional sense." Id. at 432 (citing H.R. REP. No. 
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., at AI8 (1954». This statement should not be 
interpreted as meaning that "income" as used in the Sixteenth Amendment 
means gross income, however, because the focus of the discussion in Glenshaw 
Glass was on the definition of gross income, not in the propriety of taxing the 
same. To date the Court has not specifically addressed the latter issue .. 
26. See Note, Taxability of Gross Income Under the Sixteenth Amendment, 36 
COLUM. L. REV. 274 (1936), wherein the author asserts that, although deductions 
are accepted to be matters of legislative grace, "[t)he cases under the post-
Amendment statutes have consistently proceeded on the assumption that ... 
deduction of capital costs is necessary to arrive at income resulting from sales." 
Id. at 280. There is no specific indication of how the drafters meant the term 
to be defined. Id. at 276-78. Nonetheless, the author posits that the "legislative 
grace" accorded to Congress in allowing deductions is limited to those deduc-
tions not necessary to acquiring income. !d. at 280-8\. 
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Indeed, certain members of Congress expressed' a belief that 
taxing gross income might be beyond the scope of their constitutional 
authority when they rejected a proposal made in 1951 by Senator 
Kefauver to impose a special gambling tax. 27 The concern of the 
opponents to Senator Kefauver's idea was that taxing the gross 
incomes of those convicted of crimes might amount to an unconsti-
tutional interference with state police powers by using a federal 
statute to impose punishment for violations of state law. 28 The same 
concern was earlier addressed hy the Supreme Court in United States 
v. Constantine,29 in which the Court concluded that a higher tax on 
illegal income amounts to a penalty imposed upon the wrongdoer 
and that the federal government has no power to penalize taxpayers 
for violations of state laws.30 The Court concluded that federal income 
tax law is not intended as a penal statute, but rather as a revenue-
producing measure. 31 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC POLICY 
DOCTRINE UNDER § 162 
Despite the dicta in Constantine and demonstrated congressional 
reluctance to draw a distinction between deductions emanating from 
legal and illegal enterprises, the lower courts went about exploring 
methods to effectuate disallowance of the latter variety. The earliest 
case disallowing a deduction for public policy reasons was based on 
the notion that allowing a deduction amounted to condoning the 
activity giving rise to the expense.32 Since Congress had made clear 
that all businesses were subject to the same tax scheme, however, 
this rationale was destined to be short-lived. Subsequently, the courts 
began to focus on the statutory words "ordinary and necessary" as 
27. Opponents of the Kefauver proposal suggested that the distinction for tax 
purposes between income from legal and illegal sources "may raise a serious 
constitutional question" by making the application of federal tax law dependent 
on the laws of the states. 97 CONGo REC. 12239-40 (1951). 
28. Id. 
29. 296 U.S. 287 (1935). 
30. Id. at 295-96; see also Nichols V. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 541 (1927) ("[U)nder 
the mere guise of reaching something within its powers Congress may not lay 
a charge upon what is beyond them. "). 
31. Constantine, 296 U.S. at 295-96. 
32. The earliest vestige of the public policy doctrine in the U.S. seems to be 
contained in Backer V. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924), in which the court 
held that to allow a deduction stemming from an illegal activity would amount 
to recognizing the activity as legitimate. Id. The actual origin of the public 
policy doctrine, though, has been traced to the British case of Commissioners 
of Inland Revenue v. Warnes & Co., 2 K.B. 444 (1919). E.g., Comment, 
Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of Sanc-
tioning With the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.l. 108, 108 n.l (1962). 
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a means to restrict the deductions available to illegal enterprises.33 
In Commissioner v. Textile Mills Securities Corp., 34 for example, 
the Third Circuit denied a deduction for any payments made pursuant 
to a contract which was found to be void for public policy reasons. 3S 
The court noted that payments made pursuant to a contract rendered 
void on public policy grounds could not be considered "ordinary" 
and thus were not deductible under the statute.36 
Within three years, however, the Supreme Court explicitly re-
jected the Third Circuit's interpretation of the "ordinary and nec-
essary" language of the statute. In Commissioner v. Heininger,37 the 
Court found· that expenditures need only be "appropriate and help-
ful" to fall within the ambit of the statute.38 In Heininger, the 
taxpayer had been selling false teeth through mail order advertise-
33. I.R.C. § 162 provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the 
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in 
carrying on any trade or business .... " I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988). There is 
apparently no meaningful legislative history regarding exactly what Congress 
meant when it used the phrase "ordinary and necessary." Raymond Bertolini 
Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120, 1122-23 (6th Cir. 1984). 
34. 117 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1940), aiI'd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). 
35. Id. The court held that a contract calling for a domestic corporation to lobby 
for favorable legislation relating to foreign business interests was against public 
policy. As such, payments made pursuant to the contract were not properly 
deductible. Id. 
36. Id. at 65 ("[T]he payment of moneys [sic] for carrying out a purpose contrary 
to public policy is by no means ordinary. "). Interestingly, the court also 
decided that payments for the purpose of lobbying could not be "necessary" 
either, because lobbying for legislation can never be shown to proximately 
cause its passage, given the free will of the legislative body. Id. 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Clark identified three possible meanings 
of the term "ordinary." The first was the dictionary definition (customary, 
usual or normal); the second was a definition borrowed from tort concepts 
(foreseeable). The third definition seemed most likely to Judge Clark to have 
been intended by Congress: a category of expenses which includes no practices 
falling below the standards to which the courts have given their approval. Id. 
at 73 (Clark, J., concurring). 
37. 320 U.S. 467 (1943). 
38. Id. at 471. The Court reasoned that if an expense is of the type which the 
taxpayer would normally be expected to pay under the circumstances, and the 
expenditure is made in good faith, reasonable as to amount, and can be viewed 
as appropriate and helpful to the business, then there is no question but that 
it is "ordinary and necessary" within the meaning of the statute. Id. 
The term "ordinary" has generally been accepted to distinguish only 
between items currently deductible and those representing capital expenditures. 
See, e.g., Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. United States, 708 F.2d 1043 (6th 
Cir. 1983). That the term "necessary" encompasses "only the minimal require-
ment that the expense be 'appropriate and helpful' for 'the development of 
the [taxpayer's] business'" has been firmly established in tax jurisprudence. 
Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 
290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933». 
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ments. 39 The expenses sought to be deducted were legal fees incurred 
in opposing a "fraud order" issued by the Post Office.4O Although 
Heininger ultimately failed in his attempt to obtain an injunction 
against the Post Office, the Court found that a good faith defense 
against a fraud charge was no different than a defense against a 
malpractice or breach of contract claim; since the action taken by 
the Post Office threatened to destroy the taxpayer's business, the 
expenses of a defense were held to be both ordinary and necessary. 41 
In the present context, however, the Heininger decision is notable 
less for its holding than for its dicta. In reconciling its holding with 
previous cases in which deductions were denied for expenses such as 
penalties for violation of statutes and payments. made to influence 
the awarding of government contracts, the Court recognized that the 
language of § 16242 could legitimately be read to exclude certain 
deductions "in order that tax deduction consequences might not 
frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing partic-
ular types of conduct. "43 Thus while Heininger rejected the conclusion 
that expenses of an illegal enterprise were per se not "ordinary and 
necessarY,"44 it established a standard by which to judge the validity 
of the disallowance of a deduction on public policy grounds. 45 
Pursuant to this standard, it was left to the courts to define exactly 
what would constitute "frustrating sharply defined policies" such 
that a deduction should be disallowed. 
The Fourth Circuit's attempt to do so in Lilly v. Commissioner«> 
by resurrecting the rationale of Textile Mills was rejected by the 
Supreme Court.47 Thomas and Helen Lilly, who operated an optical 
39. Heininger, 320 U.S. at 469. 
40. [d. 
41. Although the Court noted that the continued existence of the taxpayer's lawful 
business was being threatened, id. at 472, nowhere else in the opinion is a 
distinction made between the treatment of lawful and unlawful enterprises. It 
would appear, therefore, that the inclusion of the reference to a "lawful 
.business" was inadvertent on the part of Justice Black. 
42. The Court was actually dealing with § 23(a) of the 1939 Internal Revenue 
Code; as indicated in note II, supra, however, all references will be to the 
current Code. Section 162(a) of the current Code is identical to § 23(a) of the 
1939 Code. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988); I.R.C. § 23(a) (1939). 
13. Heininger, 320 U.S. at 473 (emphasis added). 
44. The current interpretation of these terms is that "ordinary" merely distinguishes 
capital expenditures from those which are currently deductible; "necessary" 
encompasses only the minimal requirement that the expense be appropriate and 
helpful to the development of the taxpayer's business. Commissioner v. Tellier, 
383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966). 
45. Subsequent to Heininger, the tax court and other federal courts began using 
this phrase as the touchstone of nondeductibility. See, e.g., Commissioner v. 
Pacific Mills, 207 F.2d 177, 182 (1st Cir. 1953). 
46. 188 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1951), rev'd, 343 U.S. 90 (1952). 
47. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 95 (1952). 
52 Baltimore Law Review (Vol. 22 
shop,48 attempted to deduct commissions paid to eye doctors who 
referred their patients to the Lillys' shop to purchase eyeglasses.49 In 
ostensibly following the Heininger rationale, the Fourth Circuit dis-
allowed the deduction on the basis that the arrangement amounted 
to an illegal agreement for a secret consideration in the context of a 
confidential relationship.50 Such an agreement was therefore void on 
the basis of public policy: "We certainly will not lend the force of 
any opinion of this court to sanction, as an 'ordinary and necessary' 
'expense of the optician's business, the making and carrying out of 
'such unconscionable and reprehensible contracts for secret kickbacks 
to a doctor. "51 
The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of Heininger,52 
noting that the judiciary need "voice no approval of the business 
ethics or public policy involved" in determining that such payments 
are ordinary and necessary within the meaning of the tax statute. 53 
Specifically, the national or state policies referred to in Heininger 
must be "evidenced by some governmental declaration of them. "54 
Furthermore, it must be the payment of the expense which contra-
venes the governmental declaration, not the nature of the underlying 
obligation;55 the fact that the underlying obligation may not be 
enforceable because it represents a contract in contravention of public 
policy is of no event in analyzing the deductibility of an expense. 
Thus in Lilly the Court made clear that a mere violation of the law 
was not enough "frustration" of public policy to warrant the denial 
of a deduction. 
Seven years elapsed before the Court articulated exactly what 
would meet the disallowance standard in Heininger. In Tank Truck 
48. Lilly, 188 F.2d at 270. 
49. 1d. 
50. [d. at 271 (citing 6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 4907 (rev. ed.». 
51. [d. 
52. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952). 
53. [d. at 97. 
54. [d. 
55. The tax court had held, as a matter of law, that the contracts pursuant to 
which the payments were made violated public policy. Lilly v. Commissioner, 
14 T.C. 1066, 1086 (1950), aII'd, 188 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1951), rev'd, 343 
U.S. 90 (1952). The Fourth Circuit, in affirming the tax court decision, based 
its holding on a finding that the contracts were "unconscionable and repre-
hensible." Lilly, 188 F.2d at 271. In contrast, the Supreme Court opinion 
focused on the payments themselves, noting that the continuance of the 
payments were "as essential to [the Lillys' business) as were their other business 
expenses" because, without such payments, doctors would discontinue referrals. 
Lilly, 343 U.S. at 94. The Court expressed no concern over whether the 
contracts themselves could have been enforced, which is exactly the basis on 
which the lower courts reached their decisions. 
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Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,56 the Court found that a state policy 
reflected by the imposition of monetary penalties for specific types 
of conduct would be thwarted by allowance of a deduction for the 
payment of those penalties.57 The test enunciated by Justice Clark, 
writing for a unanimous Court, was that the nondeductibility of an 
expense rested upon the severity and immediacy of the frustration 
that would follow from allowing the deduction.58 In cases where the 
expenditure itself is prohibited by law, public policy would most 
clearly be frustrated by allowing a tax deduction for the payment. 59 
The payment of a penalty imposed by the State was viewed by the 
Court as being only slightly less remote, and well within the para-
meters of frustration contemplated by Heininger and its progeny.60 
Because allowing a deduction for the payment of a penalty would 
reduce its "sting," public policy was deemed to prohibit such a 
result. 61 Pursuant to the Court's language in Tank Truck Rentals, 
therefore, the only two categories of claimed deductions which were 
recognized as frustrating public policy sufficiently to warrant disal-
lowance were illegal payments and the payment of penalties imposed 
by the government. 
These strict limitations on the use of the public policy doctrine 
thus stated were reiterated and clarified by Justice Douglas in Com-
missioner v. Sullivan. 62 Sullivan operated an illegal gambling enter-
prise in Chicago. 63 The tax court held that payments for wages and 
rent could not be deducted because they represented expenditures 
made in connection with illegal acts.64 The Supreme Court rejected 
this rationale on the basis of the Heininger and Lilly decisions. 65 In 
so doing, Justice Douglas attempted to set out objective standards 
for determining the deductibility of expenses emanating from an 
illegal enterprise. The analysis must begin with the proposition that 
any expenditures made to conduct the business itself are presumed 
to be deductible.66 Such expenses only become nondeductible on the 
56. 356 U.S. 30 (1958). 
57. [d. at 36-37. 
58. [d. at 35. 
59. [d. 
60. [d. 
61. [d. at 35-36. 
62. 356 U.S. 27 (1958). 
63. [d. at 28. 
64. Mesi v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 513 (1955), rev'd, 241 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1957), 
rev'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958). 
65. The '''fact that an expenditure bears a remote relation to an illegal act' does 
not make it nondeductible." Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958) 
(quoting Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943». 
66. Justice Douglas based his reasoning on the fact that excise taxes on wagers 
were deductible pursuant to a Treasury Department regulation: "The policy 
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basis of public policy if: (1) the deduction itself is a device to lessen 
the economic effect of a penalty imposed by statute,67 or (2) the 
deduction would contravene a federal policy expressed in a statute 
or regulation. 68 
It is clear from both Sullivan and Commissioner v. Tellier, 69 
decided eight years later, that the Court felt that the focus of the 
analysis must be. on the payment of the expense, not the conduct 
giving rise to it. 70 In Tellier, the underlying transaction giving rise to 
the expense was a taxpayer's defense against criminal charges.71 
Expenditures for such a defense are certainly not, and could not be, 
prohibited by statute.72 Since the expenditures themselves did not 
violate a statute and did not constitute the payment of a penalty, 
the deduction did not frustrate public policy and was legitimate if 
the payments were helpful in the conduct of the taxpayer's business. 73 
that allows as a deduction the tax paid to conduct the business seems sufficiently 
hospitable to allow the normal deductions of the rent and wages necessary to 
operate it." [d. at 28-29. The same conclusion would undoubtedly have been 
reached in the absence of a regulation on the basis that expenditures used to 
conduct a business are "ordinary and necessary" within the definition set out 
in Heininger. [d. at 29. 
67. [d. This is the same test used in Tank Truck Rentals. See supra notes 56-61 
and accompanying text; see also Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 
356 U.S. 38,40 (1958) (holding that penalties arising from inadvertent violations 
of state laws are no more deductible than those arising from wanton and 
willful violations). 
68. Sullivan, 356 U.S. at 29. 
69. 383 U.S. 687 (1966). 
70. The reasoning found in both Sullivan and Tellier give rise to this conclusion. 
In the former case, Justice Douglas cited his earlier opinion in Commissioner 
v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 314 U.S. 326 (1941), for the proposition that 
payments which contravene federal policy are nondeductible. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 
at 28. In Textile Mills, disallowance of a deduction was founded on the basis 
that the specific payment at issue (lobbying expenses) were prohibited by 
regulation. Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 337. In Tellier, Justice Stewart's focus 
was on whether the payment made for legal defense against criminal charges 
constituted "proscribed conduct." Tellier, 383 U.S. at 694. In these cases, 
therefore, the Court did not analyze the propriety of disallowance with reference 
to some intrinsic violation of public policy due to the taxpayer's unlawful 
conduct; rather, the analysis focused on whether the payment of the expense 
itself violates a prohibition found in a statute or regulation. 
That this is a correct reading of these decisions was reiterated by the Sixth 
Circuit in Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120 
(6th Cir. 1984). In that case, a deduction was sought for "kickback" payments 
made by subcontractors relating to a construction project. [d. at 1121-22. In 
holding that such payments were a "cost of doing business like any other," 
the court focused on the legality of the payment, noting that the payment was 
not prohibited by law in the applicable jurisdiction. [d. at 1125. 
71. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 688. 
72. [d. at 694 (noting that there is a constitutional right to counsel). 
73. [d. at 689. 
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Because the criminal charges against the taxpayer found their source 
in his business activities as a securities dealer, they were both ordinary 
and necessary and therefore deductible notwithstanding any public 
policy argument to the contrary. 74 
Thus, the judicial formulation of the public policy doctrine which 
culminated in Tellier contained discernable parameters. In keeping 
with the literal requirements of the Code, it was acknowledged that 
all ordinary and necessary business expenses were presumed deduct-
ible, regardless of the legal or illegal nature of the business.7s It is 
only in specific, narrowly drawn circumstances that allowance of a 
deduction will be considered to so sharply frustrate public policy that 
an exception will be read into the Code. Through the Tellier line of 
cases, the only such circumstances recognized were when the payments 
themselves are illegal or represent the payment of a fine imposed by 
the government. 76 
Subsequent to the judicial formulation of the public policy 
doctrine, Congress chose to codify the doctrine as part of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 by amending I.R.C. § 162.77 The legislative 
body's intent was to codify the prior formulation of the courts. 78 
While the Senate Report accompanying the bill which accomplished 
the codification hints at a fear on the part of the legislature that the 
courts may not have been effectively restrained in their views of 
public policy absent statutory clarification,79 the language of the 
amendment merely recognized by statute a public policy exception 
74. [d. at 689-90. 
75. "We start with the proposition that the federal income tax is a tax on net 
income, not a sanction against wrongdoing. That principal has been firmly 
imbedded in the tax statute from the beginning." [d. at 691. 
76. See Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. United States, 708 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 
1983) (allowing a trucking company convicted of weight violations to deduct 
the "liquidated damage" assessed against it by the State of Virginia). At least 
one case went so far as to suggest that Tellier has abrogated the public policy 
doctrine altogether. See Finger v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 312, 314 (D.S.C. 
1966). 
77. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
78. The Senate Report accompanying the bill indicates that the legislation "rep-
resents a codification of the general court" position" in regard to fines or 
penalties. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 274 (1969). 
79. The Senate Report begins by noting that "there is no statutory provision setting 
forth a general 'public policy' basis for denying deductions which are 'ordinary 
and necessary' business deductions." [d. at 273. The discussion concludes by 
stating that "public policy, in other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently 
clearly defined to justify the disallowance of deductions." [d. at 274; see also 
Mazzei v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 497, 506 (1974) (Sterrett, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that although the codification directly affects only § 162, "it does 
seem to call for judicial restraint" in the context of other deduction sections 
as well). 
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coextensive with that already recognized by the. judiciary. Consistent 
with the cases analyzed above, I.R.C. § 162 was amended to add 
provisions explicitly disallowing deductions for the payment of 
penalties80 as well as for payments which themselves violate the law. 81 
Furthermore, the legislative history of the enactment makes it clear 
that Congress intended its codified version of the public policy 
doctrine to completely occupy this area of the tax law. 82 Acknowl-
edging this, the Service issued regulations providing as follows: "A 
deduction for an expense paid or incurred after December 30, 1969, 
which would otherwise be allowable under section 162 shall not be 
denied on the grounds that allowance of such a deduction would 
frustrate a sharply defined public policy. "83 Since the codification 
was consistent with the Tellier line of cases,84 the action by Congress 
did not change the public policy doctrine in any way but merely 
limited further development of the doctrine under I.R.C. § 162. The 
remaining portion of this Comment discusses the propriety of con-
tinued development of the doctrine under other sections of the Code, 
particularly § 165. 
IV. DEDUCTIONS UNDER § 165 
Section 165 of the Code allows a deduction for any loss not 
compensated by insurance. 8s If the loss claimed is one of property, 
80. I.R.C. § 162(0 provides that "[n]o deduction shall be allowed under [§ 162(a)] 
for any fine or similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any 
law." I.R.C. § 162(f) (1988). A further provision was added to deny a deduction 
for the "penalty" portion of treble damage awards for violations of antitrust 
laws. I.R.C. § 162(g) (1988). 
81. Section 162( c )(2) of the Code provides in part: 
No deduction shall be allowed under [§ 162(a)] for any payment ... 
made, directly or indirectly, to any person, if the payment constitutes 
an illegal bribe, illegal kickback, or other illegal payment under any 
law of the United States, or under any law of a State . . . which 
subjects the payor to a criminal penalty or the loss of license or 
privilege to engage in a trade or business. 
I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) (1988). 
Section 162(c)(3) disallows deductions for kickbacks, rebates, or bribes 
made by providers of services for which payment is provided for under the 
Social Security Act. I.R.C. § 162(c)(3) (1988). 
82. "The provision for the denial of the deduction for payments in these situations 
which are deemed to violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive." S. 
REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 4 (1969). 
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.162.1(a) (1969). The tax court has also acknowledged the 
abrogation of prior contrary case law by the 1969 amendments. See, e.g., 
Brizell v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 151, 166 (1989) ("Subsequent to the enactment 
of section 162(c)(2), however, the cases [suggesting a broader public policy 
limitation] lack continuing vitality. "). 
84. See supra notes 37-74 and accompanying text. 
85. l.R.C. § 165(a) (1988). "Loss" under this section generally means a loss 
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§ 165 gives rise to a deduction in the amount of the taxpayer's 
adjusted basis in the property.86 The public policy doctrine as analyzed 
above in the context of I.R.C. § 162 has been recognized to apply 
to loss deductions claimed under § 165 since at least 1959. In that 
year the tax court decided Richey v. Com missioner, 87 holding that a 
theft loss claimed under I.R.C. § 165 was disallowed on public policy 
grounds.88 In Richey the petitioner was attempting to engage in a 
scheme to counterfeit United States currency when he was duped by 
his cohorts;89 the court disallowed the deduction because it was related 
to illegal activity on the part of the taxpayer. 90 
Because the property loss in Richey consisted of the taxpayer's 
genuine currency, the rationale of the holding can be reconciled with 
the line of cases under I.R.C. § 162. The "payment" in this case 
was the money the taxpayer had turned over to his confederates for 
the purpose of effectuating the counterfeiting activity. 91 As such, the 
situation was analogous to a payment made in violation of the law 
which would preclude a deduction under the categories established 
under § 162.92 
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's opinion in Tellier, the tax 
court had an opportunity to revisit the issue in a case factually similar 
to Richey. In Mazzei v. Commissioner,93 the court again disallowed 
a theft loss deduction claimed by a defrauded would-be counter-
feiter. 94 As in Richey, the holding could be reconciled with the Tellier 
line of cases by analogizing the loss to an illegal payment. In Mazzei, 
however, the tax court for the first time asserted that the public 
policy doctrine developed under § 162 was not applicable to cases 
arising under § 165.95 If this premise is accepted, the door is left 
incurred in a trade or business or transaction entered into for profit, as well 
as losses of property due to some casualty, such as fire, storm, etc. Id. § 
165(c). 
86. Id. § 165(b). 
87. 33 T.C. 272 (1959). 
88. Id. at 276-77. 
89. Id. at 273-74. 
90. Id. at 276-77. 
91. Id. at 273. 
92. Section 162(c)(2) disallows deductions for payments which would be illegal 
"under any law of the United States, or under any law of a State .... " 
I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) (1988). 
93. 61 T.C. 497 (1974). 
94. Id. at 502. 
95. Id. Judge Quealy's opinion stated that "[w)hile it is also recognized that the 
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966), may have 
redefined the criteria for the disallowance on grounds of public policy of an 
otherwise deductible business expense under section I 62(a), we do not have 
that type of case." Id. (emphasis added). The opinion goes on to distinguish 
the present case from Tellier by stating that the relationship of the illegality 
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open for the development of a new version of the public policy 
doctrine specifically applicable to § 165 and unrestrained by the 
earlier line of cases and Code amendments. 
Examples demonstrating that the Service and the courts have 
bought into this notion abound. In Rev. Rul. 77-126,96 the Service 
addressed the issue of whether contraband seized by the government 
and thereby forfeited by the taxpayer could give rise to a deductible 
loss.97 In reaching the conclusion that public policy would preclude 
such a deduction, the Service expressed its opinion that "the rules 
for disallowing a deduction under § 165 of the Code on the grounds 
of public policy were not limited by Congress, but remain the same 
as they were before [the 1969 amendments to § 162]. "98 
The specific issue presented in Rev. Rul. 77-126 was whether a 
§ 165 loss should be allowed for the taxpayer's basis in gambling 
devices seized by the government under § 7301 of the Code.99 Ac-
cording to the Service, the policy which would be frustrated by 
allowing such a deduction was that embodied in the statute making 
possession of coin-operated gambling devices unlawful. 1oo 
The forfeiture at issue could be analogized to a government-
imposed penalty designed to discourage specific conduct-in this case, 
the possession of property for which special excise taxes had not 
been paid. Since such penalties constitute one category of items held 
nondeductible as business expenses in the public policy cases under 
§ 162,101 the ruling is clearly reconcilable with both the common law 
and codified versions of the doctrine.102 The "payment" in this case 
would consist of the taxpayer's economic loss represented by the 
adjusted basis of the property; as such, it is as much a penalty as is 
a direct monetary assessment and would have been disallowed under 
both § 162(f)103 and Tank Truck Rentals}04 
to the payment was more direct than in the latter case. [d. Nonetheless. it is 
clear that the court was persuaded by the distinction between the Code sections: 
"The ultimate question for decision in this case is whether considerations of 
public policy should enter into the allowance of a theft loss under section 
165(c)(3)." [d. 
96. Rev. Rul. 77-126. 1977-1 C.B. 47. 
97. [d. at 48. 
98. [d. 
99. [d. I.R.C. § 7301 authorizes the seizure of certain property subject to excise 
tax when the tax remains unpaid. I.R.C. § 7301 (1988). 
100. Rev. Rul. 77-126, 1977-1 C.B. 48. 
101. See discussion supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
102. Stephens v. Commissioner. 905 F.2d 667. 672 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Congress can 
hardly be considered to have intended to create a scheme where a payment 
would not pass muster under Section [1621. but would still qualify for a 
deduction under Section 165."). 
103. I.R.C. § 162(0 provides: "No deduction shall be allowed ... for any fine or 
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That the Service implicitly relied on this logic is revealed in the 
following assertion: 
Allowing the taxpayer in the instant case to deduct the losses 
resulting from the forfeiture of the gambling devices would 
frustrate sharply defined public policy that makes it unlawful 
for owners of coin-operated gambling devices to possess 
such devices because the deduction would soften the sting 
oj, and thus frustrate, the sanction of seizure and forfeit-
ure. IOS 
While not explicitly adopting the suggested analogy to penalties, the 
Service used the same language which Justice Clark used to support 
the denial of deductions for penalty payments in Tank Truck Ren-
tals .106 This parallel language suggests a parallel justification for 
disallowing the deduction. Thus, while indicating that it does not 
consider itself restrained by the earlier development of the public 
policy doctrine under § 162, the Service explicitly relies on a similar 
rationale in reaching its conclusion. 
In an opinion issued the same year, the tax court reached a 
similar conclusion, although the basis for its rationale is slightly less 
clear. In Holt v. Commissioner,107 the court was confronted by a 
taxpayer who was engaged in the business of purchasing, transport-
ing, and selling marijuana. lOS At the time of his arrest, the taxpayer's 
truck and horse trailer, which were used in his business, as well as 
his inventory of marijuana, were seized by police. 109 Holt claimed a 
§ 165 loss deduction in the amount of his adjusted basis in these 
items. 110 
Stating that "[i]t would clearly be contrary to public policy to 
allow a deduction for such forfeitures," 11 I the court explained that 
"[i]f loss deductions were allowed in this case, the government would 
in effect be carrying a portion of the loss inflicted by the government 
similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law." I.R.C. 
§ 162(0 (1988). 
104. See discussion supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
105. Rev. Rul. 77-126, 1977~1 C.B. 47 (emphasis added). 
106. Justice Clark's opinion stated that the "[d]eduction of fines and penalties 
uniformly has been held to frustrate state policy in severe and direct fashion 
by reducing the 'sting' of the penalty prescribed by the state legislature." Tank 
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1958) (citations 
omitted). 
107. 69 T.C. 75 (1977), aff'd, 611 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1980). 
108. [d. at 76. 
109. [d. at 77. 
110. [d. 
111. [d. at 80. 
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on the petitioners because of Holt's illegal activities."112 As in the 
earlier Revenue Ruling, this statement seems to indicate that the 
legitimate public policy reason for denying the deduction is that the 
forfeitures amount to a penalty, and allowance of such a deduction 
would reduce the penalty's sting. 1I3 
Following in the footsteps of the Service, however, the court 
injects a degree of ambiguity into its rationale when it asserts that 
there is a "sharply defined national policy against the sale of 
marijuana"114 evidenced by the severe criminal penalties imposed on 
the taxpayer. IIS Thus, while correctly recognizing the public policy 
principle behind disallowing deductions for penalties, the court seems 
to also base its reasoning on the idea that allowing deductions related 
to the sale of marijuana would be against public policy because the 
activity itself is illegal. I16 Again, this rationale is distinct from that 
used to formulate the public policy doctrine under § 162 and, in 
fact, is directly inapposite to the holding in Sullivan.1I7 
The Fifth Circuit replicates the same confused rationale of Holt 
in Wood v. United States. liS In Wood, the taxpayer had used proceeds 
from the sale of drugs to invest in a real estate development project. 1I9 
After the government seized the real property thus acquired, the 
taxpayer claimed a loss deduction under § 165.12° As in Holt, the 
Fifth Circuit first lays the foundation for finding that the forfeiture 
is nondeductible as a penalty: 
The legislative history of [the forfeiture statute] reveals that 
the forfeiture provision was designed to reach drug traffick-
ers "where it hurts the most" and to augment "the tradi-
tional criminal sanctions of fines and imprisonment.". . . 
Allowing a loss deduction would certainly "take the sting" 
out of a penalty intended to deter drug dealing. 121 
112. [d. 
113. The justification used in Holt conjures up the language used in Tank Truck 
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958), where Justice Clark 
characterized a proposed deduction for the payment of a fine as taking the 
"sting" out of the penalty. See supra note 106. 
114. Holt, 69 T.C. at 79. 
115. The court notes that Holt was sentenced to ten years in prison and fined 
$30,000. [d. at 80. 
116. The court states that "[i]t would clearly be contrary to public policy to allow 
a deduction" for forfeitures related to the sale of marijuana. [d. 
117. See discussion supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text. Under I.R.C. § 162, 
it is not due to the nature of the business that the public policy doctrine 
forecloses a deduction, but rather the nature of the deduction itself. Commis-
sioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28-29 (1958). 
118. 863 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1989). 
119. [d. at 418. 
120. [d. at 419. 
121. [d. at 421-22 (citations omitted). 
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Once again, however, the court supplements its analysis by further 
stating that "the public policy embodied in this nation's drug laws 
is not enhanced by allowing a tax deduction to offset a forfeiture. "122 
Although this statement is certainly true, whether or not the allowance 
of a deduction would enhance other non-tax statutory schemes had 
never before been recognized as a basis for disallowance. Indeed, 
Sullivan would have been wrongly decided had such a broad standard 
prevailed. What seems to have escaped the court was that the case 
before it was brought to determine tax liability, not punishment 
under criminal statutes. 123 
Nonetheless, in a case factually similar to Wood, the Fourth 
Circuit cited the Wood decision as standing for the proposition that 
"allowing a deduction for forfeited assets would violate the 'sharply 
defined national policy against' drug trafficking."124 As was the case 
in Holt, this premise is clearly contrary to the direction given by 
Sullivan and other cases defining the public policy doctrine as it 
relates to I.R.C. § 162. Thus we see emerging an application of the 
public policy doctrine not only distinct from, but in fact directly 
contrary to the earlier cases. 
Evidence of this new line of thinking can be found in the context 
of other types of deductions claimed under I.R.C. § 165. In Rev. 
Rul. 82_74,125 the Service was confronted with a situation in which 
the taxpayer, the owner of a commercial building, paid an arsonist 
to burn the building down.126 Upon collecting the insurance proceeds, 
the taxpayer reduced the amount received by his adjusted basis in 
the building and claimed the amount paid to the arsonist as a business 
expense. 127 
As correctly pointed out in the ruling, the amount paid to the 
arsonist would be disallowed as an illegal payment. 128 For the same 
reason, the payment to the arsonist could not be added to the 
taxpayer's basis in the property to determine the amount of gain 
resulting from collection of the insurance proceeds. The Service, 
however, again focused on a source of public policy distinct from 
122. [d. at 421. 
123. "[TJhe federal income tax is a tax on net income, not a sanction against 
wrongdoing." Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966). 
124. Smith v. Commissioner, No. 90-1143, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18741, at ·4 
(4th Cir. Aug. 15, 1991) (citing Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417, 420-22 
(5th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added». Although Congress had in fact enacted a 
separate provision to preclude deductions related to drug trafficking, I.R.C. 
§ 280E (1988), the Smith court makes no reference to that Code section but 
instead seems to rely on non-tax laws against such activity. 
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that accepted by the courts regarding § 162. Rather than pointing 
out that payments made in violation of the law cannot be deducted 
by reason of the public p'olicy doctrine set out in cases such as 
Sullivan, the Service referred instead to the public policy embodied 
in the "statutory scheme regarding arson and insurance fraud. "129 
Similarly, in Blackman v. Commissioner130 the taxpayer set fire 
to his own house in the course of a domestic dispute. 131 The tax 
court correctly noted that gross negligence on the part of the taxpayer 
will bar a casualty loss deduction under § 165.132 Since the court held 
that the taxpayer's conduct was grossly negligent,133 no further ra-
tionale was necessary to deny the deduction. Nevertheless, the court 
felt compelled to invoke an additional public policy justification for 
denying the deduction, stating that "allowing the petitioner a deduc-
tion would severely and immediately frustrate the articulated public 
policy of Maryland against arson and burning." 134 Unlike the line of 
cases decided under § 162, the court did not focus on the "payment" 
involved, but on the underlying illegal activity. While paying lip 
service to the test developed under § 162, the court again seems to 
be going in a different direction. 13S 
This emerging notion that the public policy doctrine is distinct 
as between one deduction section of the Code and another is unsup-
ported by either logic or law. When interpreting tax statutes, the 
structure and policy of the Code as a whole, or what one commen-
tator refers to as the "tax logic" of the Code,136 must be considered, 
for "the tax code is just that-a code, not merely a series of unrelated 
enactments."137 Courts should endeavor, therefore, to reconcile the 
logic of a given Code section with that embodied in related Code 
sections. The failure to do so allows room for intolerably inconsistent 
results under the two Code sections. Suppose, for example, a thief 
enters an unlicensed and illegally operated drinking establishment 
129. Rev. Rut. 82-74, 1982-1 C.B. 110, 111. 
130. 88 T.C. 677 (1987), a/I'd, 867 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1988). 
131. Id. at 679. 
132. Id. at 681 (citing Heyn v. Commissioner, 4 T.e. 302, 308 (1966». 
133. Id. at 682. 
134. Id. 
135. Judge Sterrett made the following observation in his dissent to Mazzei: "[W]e 
apparently pay lip service to the Supreme Court by stating 'that to allow the 
loss deduction would constitute an immediate and severe frustration of the 
clearly defined policy ... .' Unfortunately, ... we fail to discuss precisely 
how that frustration will occur." Mazzei v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 497, 506 
(1974) (Sterrett, J., dissenting). Judge Sterrett's comments would appear to 
have continuing relevance in light of the Holt and BlaCkman line of cases. 
136. See Michael A. Livingston, Congress, The Courts, and The Code: Legislative 
History and the Interpretation 0/ Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991). 
137. Id. at 826. 
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and steals the jukebox and all the liquor. While the owners could 
properly deduct the expense of replacing the alcohol held for illegal 
sale, under prevailing interpretations it would be deemed offensive 
to public policy to allow them to recover the cost of the jukebox via 
a § 165 loss deduction. Another example might involve a professional 
hitman whose car is stolen while "on the job." While the gangster 
would arguably be able to deduct the cost of his bullets, the public 
policy doctrine would not tolerate a deduction for the theft of his 
automobile. 138 The notion that Congress would have intended to erect 
an absolute public policy barrier to deductions under one Code 
section while at the same time narrowing the use of public policy to 
deny a deduction for arguably similar types of expenses under a 
related Code section defies logic and common sense. To so interpret 
these provisions is to render the Code nothing more than a series of 
unrelated revenue measures. 
That an expense legitimately deductible under I.R.C. § 162 may 
not pass muster under § 165 because of the currently inconsistent 
application of the public policy doctrine reflects a Machiavellian 
approach to tax law which, while perhaps viscerally satisfying, mocks 
the integrity of tax jurisprudence. At last, however, the courts in at 
least one circuit have moved in the direction of recognizing that the 
public policy doctrine as applied to § 162 is intrinsically connected 
to public policy analysis under other deduction sections of the Code. 139 
138. Judge Sterrett suggests similar analogies in his dissent to the Mazzei decision: 
Had petitioner contracted pneumonia on his New York excursion, 
would the majority also deny him a medical expense deduction [be-
cause the expense was incurred in the course of an illegal activity]? 
Or assume that customers on the premises of the bookmaking 
establishment involved in Sullivan were robbed by an outside intruder. 
Would the majority deny them a theft loss because they were engaged 
in an illegal activity? 
Mazzei v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 497, 507 (1974) (Sterrett, J., dissenting). 
139. This development was foreshadowed by at least one earlier tax court opinion. 
In Medeiros v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1255 (1981), the taxpayer incurred 
personal liability for failing to withhold employment taxes on behalf of his 
corporation. Medeiros argued that the payment of the taxes entitled him to a 
loss deduction under § 165(a) for losses incurred in a trade or business. [d. at 
1258. The Service argued that the amount was nondeductible by reason of § 
162(f), which denies a business deduction for fines or penalties paid to the 
government, id. at 1259, and alternatively that any deduction should be 
disallowed on public policy grounds. [d. at 1262. While the court denied the 
deduction because it found § 162 to be applicable, Judge Drennen observed 
that "[t]here is some question whether the public policy doctrine retains any 
vitality since the enactment of [the 1969 amendments]. If [the amendments 
were] intended to supplant the public policy doctrine, in all likelihood [the 
amendments] would disallow deductions under sec. 165(c)(1) .... " [d. at 1262 
n.8. 
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In Stephens v. Commissioner,14O the taxpayer had been convicted 
of defrauding a company and sought to deduct his restitution pay-
ments as losses under § 165.141 Interestingly, the Service itself argued 
that the deduction was barred, not by public policy under § 165, but 
by § 162(0.142 . 
In resolving the issue, the tax court first found that § 165 was 
indeed the applicable section in determining whether the restitution 
payments could be deducted. 143 Accepting the validity of the Service's 
analogy to the public policy doctrine codified in § 162, however, the 
court analyzed the deductibility by reference to that section. l44 Due 
to the particular factors surrounding the case,14S the court found that 
the restitution payment was analogous to a fine or penalty paid to 
the government which would be precluded from deduction by 
§ 162(0;146 as a result, the payment was likewise held to be barred 
under § 165.147 
While the Second Circuit reversed the holding of the tax court, 148 
the appellate court's reasoning implicitly accepts the logic represented 
in the lower court's opinion. 149 The Second Circuit was compelled to 
reverse because it did not believe the restitution payment to be 
sufficiently similar to a fine or penalty.ISO It recognized, however, 
that "the public policy considerations embodied in Section 162(0 are 
highly relevant in determining whether the payment ... was deduct-
ible under Section 165. "lSI 
V. CONCLUSION 
The holding in Stephens reflects the rational conclusion that 
Congress cannot have intended public policy to mean one thing when 
applied under § 162 and quite another under § 165.152 Otherwise, the 
140. 93 T.C. 108 (1989), rev'd, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990). 
141. Id. at Ill. 
142. Id. The Service did, in fact, argue in the alternative that the deduction ought 
to be barred by a more general notion of public policy if its primary argument 
failed. Id. 
143. Id. at 1l2. 
144. Id. 
145. The court noted, among other things, that the restitution payment was ordered 
in lieu of an additional prison term. Id. at 1l3. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. See Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990). 
149. Id. at 670-72. 
150. Id. at 672-73. 
151. Id. at 672. 
152. Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 672 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Congress can 
hardly be considered to have intended to create a scheme where a payment 
would not pass muster under Section [162), but would still qualify for a 
deduction under Section 165. "). 
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tax logic of the Code is completely ignored in an attempt to use the 
tax laws for a purpose for which they were never intended.1S3 It is 
time that the tax court and other circuits follow the lead of the 
Second Circuit in this regard. In light of the argument propounded 
in Stephens, it appears that the Service has finally come to its senses; 
the inconsistent application of the public policy doctrine will remain 
a danger, however, until the judiciary follows suit. 
Congress could rectify this situation by amending the Code to 
place the public policy limitations now contained in § 162 in a 
separate section of their own, making the limitations applicable to 
the Code as a whole. This is exactly the legislative method used 
when Congress decided that drug dealers should not find refuge in 
the Code by obtaining tax benefits related to their illegal activities. ls4 
The failure of the legislative body to affirmatively act to create a 
single statutory public policy doctrine applicable to the entire Code 
should not, however, be viewed as an indication of a contrary intent. 
Rather, its failure to so act may be explained by the fact that the 
class of persons who would benefit by such legislation are, by 
definition, criminals. In a time when calls for tax relief for both 
individuals and legitimate businesses are omnipresent, it is not hard 
to imagine why a legislator may hesitate to promote a bill which 
would assist only nefarious entrepreneurs in obtaining tax justice. 
Nonetheless, the integrity of tax jurisprudence requires that deter-
minations regarding deductibility be made within the framework of 
the Code, rather than with reference to a taxpayer's culpability under 
criminal law. ISS 
Charles A. Borek 
153. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
154. I.R.C. § 280E (1988). 
155. It has been noted that "'[m)oral turpitude is not a touchstone of taxability,' 
and that no 'fall-out' from the 'cloud' created by some of the questionable 
practices of [a taxpayer) should be allowed to permeate [judicial) thinking 
respecting the legal issues involved" in determining the deductibility of expenses. 
James E. Caldwell & Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 597, 615 (1955) (Bruce, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946». 
Thus "[i)t is not the petitioner's culpability, but his liability that determines 
his right to the deduction." [d. at 618 (citations omitted). 
